We report here on the set of complete proofs of Volumes I and II of Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica newly acquired by the Bertrand Russell Archives. These proof sheets, marked with a number of corrections, were likely bound for Russell by Cambridge University Press, though not exactly the same as the first edition. We assess the information to be gained from the texts and the corrections, most significantly around *110 in Vol. II and the lost dot (...) of the empty relation in Vol. I. All are in Russell’s hand and described in an appendix. We also note several revisions in the first edition that were made after these proofs. We discuss the provenance of the volumes, and Russell’s correspondence about proofs of PM with M. H. Dziewicki, but we find that there is insufficient evidence to determine the chain of possession from Russell to their discovery for sale in Australia in recent years. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand RussellPeter H. DentonNicholas Griffin, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xvii + 550. Cloth, $75.00. Paper, $26.00.It is a daunting task to conceive of a single companion to Bertrand Russell, who in life as in thought was never content with a single anything. Nicholas Griffin has brought his customary expertise to the project, (...) and in snaring fourteen other contributors to this volume, has produced a welcome addition to an academic's library of Russell materials.The shape of the volume, its contents and its presentation, however, unfortunately reflect the lopsided nature of current Russell studies. One hopes for a companion volume that has the breadth of the earlier volume edited fifty years ago by Paul Schilpp, but in vain. This book is overwhelmingly about Russell before 1918, almost entirely about philosophy of mathematics, epistemology and logic, and several of the pieces easily could have been included in a festschrift for Frege instead.What is included is well done, but to call it "the most convenient and accessible guide to Russell available" is to speak in comparative terms. To be fair, it sets out to focus on a narrow definition of Russell's contributions to modern philosophy, and the contributors accomplish this task. Ian Grattan-Guinness writes on "Mathematics in and behind Russell's Logicism, and its Reception," a subject that continues into "Bertrand Russell's Logicism" by Martin Godwyn and Andrew D. Irvine. The roots of analytic philosophy are of primary concern in this volume, so Richard L. Cartwright explores "Russell and Moore, 1898-1905" and Michael Beaney relates "Russell and Frege." "The Theory of Descriptions" by Peter Hylton sets up two pieces on "Russell's Substitutional Theory" (Gregory Landini) and "The Theory of Types" (Alasdair Urquhart), while Paul Hager's "Russell's Method of Analysis" leads into "Russell's Neutral Monism" (R.E.Tully) and "The Metaphysics of Logical Atomism" (Bernard Linsky).The next portion of the book expands the intellectual focus somewhat, with "Russell's Structuralism and the Absolute Description of the World" by William Demopoulos—perhaps [End Page 349] the best in a series of good papers—and "From Knowledge by Acquaintance to Knowledge by Causation" by Thomas Baldwin. Approaching the end of the book, Anthony Grayling's essay on "Russell, Experience, and the Roots of Science" remains firmly planted in the pre-1918 milieu, though his tentative commentary on Human Knowledge at least glimmers the extension of Russell's intellectual life into the post-Great War period.Effectively the entire second half of Russell's life is left to the final contributor, Charles Pidgen, for commentary. Author of Russell on Ethics, much of Pigden's short essay here ("Bertrand Russell: Moral Philosopher or Unphilosophical Moralist?") somewhat plaintively directs the reader to his book for an elaboration of why Russell is worth reading after 1918, at least on the subject of ethics. Of the other authors, only Hager (317) observes the extent to which Russell's post-War work mistakenly has been ignored.The book concludes with a selective bibliography. The audience, for the most part, is a specialist one, with only some essays accessible to the general reader. On that score, Griffin's introduction and his own essay, "Russell's Philosophical Background," are easily the most readable. At the risk of quibbling, I was disturbed by the uneven production of the book, as each author set his own standard for footnotes, endnotes and bibliography (creating a jumble of styles). Even within individual contributions, there are a number of inconsistencies in notation as well as typographical errors.By the end, I was left hoping there might be a second companion volume for Bertrand Russell, one that reflects what he spent the last fifty years of his life thinking, writing, and doing. In the absence of such material (which is of far greater popular interest today just as it was in Russell's lifetime), this book by itself is more of a companion to current Russell studies than to Bertrand Russell himself.Peter H. DentonThe University of WinnipegCopyright © 2004 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

Little is known about how children and adolescents conceptualize psychiatric disorders and psychiatric treatment. In the current study, children and adolescents diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) were interviewed about their understanding of ADHD and the medication used to treat their disorder. The participants were all taking Ritalin and ranged in age from 5 to 16 years. With increasing age, children improved in their ability to name their condition and the medication. Latency-aged children often did not perceive Ritalin as (...) helpful while adolescents recognized some value in taking medication. Some of the adolescents were also able to describe medication side effects. The implications of these findings for patient education are discussed. (shrink)

Animal models of human disease play a central role in modern biomedical science. Developing animal models for human mental illness presents unique practical and philosophical challenges. In this article we argue that existing animal models of psychiatric disease are not valid, attempts to model syndromes are undermined by current nosology, models of symptoms are rife with circular logic and anthropomorphism, any model must make unjustified assumptions about subjective experience, and any model deemed valid would be inherently unethical, for if an (...) animal adequately models human subjective experience, then there is no morally relevant difference between that animal and a human. (shrink)

The past 15 years have witnessed a call for allopathic medicine to incorporate psychosocial perspectives into education and clinical practice. While a biopsychosocial perspective has influenced academic medicine in areas such as primary care and psychiatry, its direct impact on clinical medicine has been questionable. One barrier to the incorporation of psychosocial information into medicine which has only recently received attention has been different cultural assumptions which govern medicine versus the social-behavioral sciences. These assumptions are examined in the context of (...) four issues: knowledge paradigms, models of education, acculturation of psychosocial knowledge into medicine, and patient autonomy. This cultural analysis provides a vantage point for understanding similarities as well as points of divergence between psychosocial and biomedical knowledge and practice. (shrink)

A recent article in this journal described practical and conceptual difficulties faced by public health researchers studying scabies outbreaks in British residential care facilities. Their study population was elderly, decisionally incapacitated residents, many of whom lacked a legally appropriate decision-maker for healthcare decisions. The researchers reported difficulties securing Research Ethics Committee approval. As practicing healthcare ethicists working in a large Canadian research hospital, we are familiar with this challenge and welcomed the authors’ invitation to join the discussion of the ‘outstanding (...) ambiguities and further questions’ that their experience uncovered. We propose a Power of Attorney for Research as one substantive solution to help address the problems they identified. Although we acknowledge the familiar shortcomings associated with Advance Directives in the clinical context, we believe that Powers of Attorney for Research Participation, accompanied by Advance Research Directives, may increase the likelihood of gaining deeper understandings of potential participant’s values and priorities and how they might apply to foreseeable research opportunities. (shrink)

Russell Herman Conwell was an American Baptist minister, orator, philanthropist, lawyer, and writer. He is best remembered as the founder and first president of Temple University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, as the Pastor of The Baptist Temple, and for his inspirational lecture Acres of Diamonds. "Acres of Diamonds" originated as a speech which Conwell delivered over 6,000 times around the world. It was first published in 1890 by the John Y. Huber Company of Philadelphia. The central idea of the work (...) is that one need not look elsewhere for opportunity, achievement, or fortune--the resources to achieve all good things are present in one's own community. This theme is developed by an introductory anecdote, told to Conwell by an Arab guide, about a man who wanted to find diamonds so badly that he sold his property and went off in futile search for them; the new owner of his home discovered that a rich diamond mine was located right there on the property. Conwell elaborates on the theme through examples of success, genius, service, or other virtues involving ordinary Americans contemporary to his audience: "dig in your own back-yard!". (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Scholars studying organizational justice have been slow to incorporate insights from behavioral ethics research, despite the fields’ conceptual affinities. We maintain that this stems from differences in the paradigmatic approaches taken by scholars in each area. First, justice research historically has assumed that individuals are motivated by a desire for instrumental control of worthwhile outcomes or by a concern with social status, while behavioral ethics has paid more attention to the role of internalized moral convictions and duties. Second, organizational justice (...) researchers have investigated one set of individual differences, behavioral researchers have examined another. Third, justice scholars focus on social identities while behavioral ethics scholars also investigate moral identities. As an impetus to future inquiry, our review attends to contemporary organizational justice research that takes into account concepts derived from behavioral ethics. In so doing we hope to highlight an avenue for integrative scholarship that will further our understanding of organizational justice. (shrink)

At the 1983 Summer Conference on the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, working groups chaired by the coauthors outlined some of the prospects for the use of somatic and germ line genetic engineering and related biological technologies to alleviate disease and to modify human behavior. They then offered a series of recommendations concerning the application of genetic engineering to persons and the monitoring of medical research and therapy.